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Abstract
Increasing complexity and multidisciplinarity make collaboration essential for modern sci-
ence. This, however, raises the question of how to assign accountability for scientific mis-
conduct among larger teams of authors. Biomedical societies and science associations
have put forward various sets of guidelines. Some state that all authors are jointly account-
able for the integrity of the work. Others stipulate that authors are only accountable for their
own contribution. Alternatively, there are guarantor type models that assign accountability to
a single author. We contribute to this debate by analyzing the outcomes of 80 scientific mis-
conduct investigations of biomedical scholars conducted by the U.S. Office of Research
Integrity (ORI). We show that the position of authors on the byline of 184 publications
involved in misconduct cases correlates with responsibility for the misconduct. Based on a
series of binary regression models, we show that first authors are 38% more likely to be
responsible for scientific misconduct than authors listed in the middle of the byline (p<0.01).
Corresponding authors are 14% more likely (p<0.05). These findings suggest that a guaran-
tor-like model where first authors are ex-ante accountable for misconduct is highly likely to
not miss catching the author responsible, while not afflicting too many bystanders.
Introduction
Over the course of the 20th century, science evolved from a norm of single authorship to col-
laboration. The average number of co-authors per publication grew from almost zero to
between 2 and 7 at the end of the century, depending on the discipline [1]. 99.4% of science
and engineering subfields exhibited an increase in average team sizes between 1955 and 2000,
while team-based publications receive more citations than single-authored publications in
97.7% of subfields [2]. Growing complexity and multidisciplinarity as well as harsh perfor-
mance evaluation policies render teamwork indispensable [1–4]. This raises normative ques-
tions about the distribution of credit and accountability among team members [5,6]. As more
collaborators take part in a project, it becomes more difficult to negotiate who should and
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should not receive credit, and who should be held accountable for individual contributions
and the integrity of the final work.
This paper considers a particular aspect of teamwork: who to hold accountable for scientific
misconduct. As association with misconduct has severe implications for even loosely associ-
ated individuals [7], it is important to design accountability rules that maximize the chances of
identifying misconducting scientists, but also to limit the chance of involving scientists who
are not guilty of misconduct. Approaches to accountability that are too broad might raise the
cost of working with potentially bad or even hard to assess collaborators to such an extent that
scientists might choose not to collaborate [8].
There are a number of different approaches to author accountability. Based on the previous
literature [8–11], we found four major scientific societies whose authorship guidelines include
accountability regimes which are relevant for biomedical scholars. Guidelines by the Interna-
tional Committee of Medical Editors (ICMJE) and the Council of Science Editors (CSE) spec-
ify that authors are only directly accountable for the work they contribute. The Committee on
Publication Ethics (COPE) and ALL European Academies (ALLEA) hold all authors account-
able for the integrity of the complete work, unless otherwise specified. We refer to the former
as ‘individual accountability’, and to the latter as ‘joint accountability’.
Additionally, a number of scholars have proposed guarantor type models which suggest
allocating accountability to one principal author-guarantor who takes final accountability for
the integrity of the entire work. Other authors are listed as contributors together with their
contributions [9,12–15]. Guarantors made substantial contributions to the research but also
made efforts to verify and uphold the integrity of the study [9]. Due to the gravity of taking on
full accountability, guarantors would often be one of the principal authors. Principal authors
are those who “take direct responsibility for the manuscript. In addition, they often direct or
manage the conduct of the research project, and serve as guarantors of the integrity of the
study.” Principal authorship would often correspond to first authorship [15]. In line with this,
the American Psychological Association suggests that first authors should act as a guarantor
for the study [16]. Whereas guarantor type models have been proposed since the late 90s, their
introduction into practice is a recent phenomenon. A growing number of journals now also
requires authors to include contributor statements [17].
Which guidelines are most commonly applied? To the best of our knowledge, there are no
studies systematically comparing the usage of the authorship guidelines listed here. The
ICMJE guidelines have been described as the ‘best known and most influential authorship cri-
teria’ [10]. Analysis of a random sample of 234 biomedical journals revealed that, of the jour-
nals providing guidelines (59%) 50.7% cited the ICMJE guidelines, 24.6% used other criteria,
and 24.6% simply required that all authors approve the manuscript [18]. This corroborates
other studies that affirm that “less than half [of top-ranking peer-reviewed journals] described
procedures for handling allegations of misconduct.” [19].
Looking at membership to the societies provides an alternative approximation of the appli-
cation of specific guidelines. Table 1 shows that ICMJE has the widest membership, with ca.
4,500 journals having requested to be listed. CSE has distinctly fewer members, less than 700.
With regard to the joint accountability guidelines, COPE sports a strong 12,000 member jour-
nals, about 3,000 of which are in the field of medicine. Finally, ALLEA does not report member
journals, but claims to be supported by approximately 60 member academies and learned soci-
eties. The uptake of guarantor models is still modest, although they have been adopted by,
among others, the American Psychological Association [16] and the BMJ [20]. Somewhat
more broadly, 11 out of the 15 top journals in the multidisciplinary sciences now require con-
tribution disclosures [17].
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How do the approaches compare? Joint accountability has been criticized as unreasonable
and unrealistic, especially in the context of growing author teams [8,12,21]. Team work has
proliferated precisely because of increasingly complex research challenges that require speciali-
zation to solve them. Therefore, holding all authors accountable for all contributions seems
unfair, is costly and creates disincentives to collaboration. Kempers cites the example that “the
clinician who stages the cancer and collects the specimens cannot vouch for the analysis by the
molecular biologist nor for the analysis of the data by the statistician” [21]. Rennie argues that
“because the only reason you seek coworkers is that they have skills you yourself lack, it is
delusional and dangerous to expect you to answer for that which by definition you cannot know
enough about because you have from the start handed off responsibility for it to another”[12].
Regardless of skill, it seems morally unjust to hold scientists responsible for tasks they did not
perform: how can it be just to hold the scientist who wrote the literature review responsible for
data manipulation performed in the lab, a task in which he was not involved? Helgesson and
Eriksson conclude that joint accountability is not acceptable from a moral point of view, as it
entails treating innocent researchers as if they were guilty of misconduct if the case should
arise. Such practices might lead scientists to be become demotivated when they feel mistreated,
and might increase the cost of picking a bad collaborator to such an extent that researchers
become hesitant towards embarking on new collaborations [8].
At first glance, joint accountability might seem attractive from an economic perspective. It is diffi-
cult and costly to identify the researcher ultimately responsible for scientific misconduct. For in-
stance, an in-depth analysis of a misconduct investigation yielded an estimate of more than $500,000
spent on legal and consulting fees, faculty and witness salary, and other expenses [22]. When detec-
tion is so costly, group punishment might appear to be more efficient. However, this comes at the
high cost of harming innocents [23,24]. Social costs are particularly high in this setting, as scientific
misconduct stigmatizes even loosely associated individuals, leading valuable research results to be
ignored as the academic community distrusts scientists in the vicinity of misconduct [7].
We contribute to the debate on accountability by analyzing who is responsible for scientific
misconduct within author teams. Concretely, we assess whether the results of U.S. Office of
Research Integrity (ORI) investigations correspond best with existing accountability guidelines
or a guarantor model. By doing so we rely on the critical distinction between responsibility
and accountability [8]. Responsibility implies moral blameworthiness and often direct culpa-
bility. That means, the responsible person is the one who actually committed the scientific mis-
conduct. Accountability entails ‘being the one to blame when things go wrong’ [8].
Our analysis is based on a set of 184 publications in biomedical science from past investiga-
tions of 80 misconduct cases conducted by the ORI. We estimate Probit models of being
responsible for misconduct within the author team as a function of the author’s position on
the byline. This reflects relative contribution and credit: first, senior (last), and corresponding
Table 1. Indicative prominence of authorship guidelines.
Guidelines Indicative use
ICMJE Approx. 4,500 journals asked to be listed
CSE Approx. 690 member journals
COPE Approx. 12,000 member journals, of which 3,000 in medicine
ALLEA 60 member academies and learned societies
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authors contribute more, and receive more credit, than contributing (middle) authors [21,25–
27]. We find that first authors are 37% more likely to be found responsible for scientific mis-
conduct than middle authors. Corresponding authors are 12% more likely.
This observation informs the design of accountability guidelines; guidelines requiring
authors to share accountability do not reflect the fact that first authors and corresponding
authors are most likely to actually be responsible for misconduct. This means that the social
cost of wrongfully holding contributing authors accountable for misconduct is likely higher
than its benefits. Guarantor models should instead prove to be more efficient, to the extent
that they allocate accountability to authors with a central role.
Materials and methods
Data
The main data source for this project is the population of Findings of Scientific Misconduct
published by the Office of Research Integrity (ORI). The ORI directs activities concerning
research integrity within the Public Health Services (PHS), including handling and overseeing
investigations of scientific misconduct in research funded by the National Institutes of Health
(NIH) and the PHS. The ORI either directly pursues inquiries and investigations into allega-
tions of scientific misconduct, or oversees institutions pursuing independent actions. When
evidence of scientific misconduct surfaces, details about the misconduct case, including who
was involved, what transpired, any affected publications, and sanctions taken are published in
Findings of Research Misconduct as well as annual reports.
The transparent reporting of misconduct by the ORI provides a major advantage, compared
to other data sources such as retractions: there is no ambiguity regarding the person responsi-
ble for misconduct within coauthor teams. This data thus allows us to compare, within
retracted or corrected publications authors who are responsible for misconduct with those
who are not. Prior studies have used this data to analyze other aspects of scientific misconduct
such as different types of accusations and outcomes, sources of funding, trends over time,
effects on innocent bystanders etc. [7,28–34].
For the purpose of our analysis, we focus on the complete list of 232 misconduct cases pub-
lished between 1993 and 2014. Of these, 81 involved at least one retracted or corrected publica-
tion, for a total of 227 affected publications. For 196 of these publications, bibliographic details
could be retrieved on Elsevier’s Scopus bibliometric database. Eleven publications were
dropped because their publication date was in years with too few publications in the sample to
adequately estimate year effects. These are publications earlier than 1985, from 1987, and from
2012. We additionally drop one case where the misconducting scientist was not part of the
author team. The final sample covers 80 misconduct cases and 184 publications.
Fig 1 shows the distribution of the number of coauthors per article. The median publication
in the sample has 4 authors; the mean is 5.17. Only 6 articles are single-authored. The tail of
the author distribution is long, with up to 18 authors documented in the sample.
We then collected the publication data of all authors listed on the 184 publications in the
final sample. The final dataset is on the publication-author level and contains 951 publication-
author 1:n relations. For every publication, all authors are listed, along with information about
whether they were deemed responsible by the ORI, their role in the publication, and their bib-
liometric profile at the time of the article’s publication.
External validity of the sample. The number of authors per publication in our sample is
highly similar to those reported by Fanelli and Larivière for a broader sample of biomedical
scientists [1]. However, the key question is not whether our data is representative for biomedi-
cal science as a whole, but whether it is representative for science in which misconduct takes
Scientific misconduct and accountability in teams
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place. Whereas it is not possible to know whether the data is representative for the full, largely
undiscovered, population of publications containing misconduct, our data is based on the
entire population of misconduct cases reported by the ORI.
Variable definitions
In order to analyze which accountability regime fits best to the empirical evidence for respon-
sibility, we estimate the likelihood of being the author responsible for scientific misconduct
within an author team. The dependent variable is a binary variable that captures whether the
respective author was deemed guilty of misconduct by the ORI, in other words, whether or not
the author was factually responsible for committing misconduct (RESP).
The main variables of interest capture the author’s position on the byline of the affected
publications. A rich literature studies the meaning of author order in biomedical disciplines
[12,15,21,25,26,35]. The most important author, in terms of contribution as well as credit, is
the first author. The first author did the majority of the experimental work and takes credit as
originator of the idea. Being first author is such an important precondition for being accepted
as scientist that many PhD programs require students to publish at least one first-author article
before graduation [25]. The next most important position is that of the senior author, who is
usually listed last. This position is one of more general oversight and direction. Senior authors
also have an important role guaranteeing the authenticity of the work reported. Another
important role is for the corresponding author, the author responsible for communicating
about the publication with editors and readers. This position typically coincides with that of
the first or senior author [25], but can also be used as a tool for sharing credit when authors
other than the first or senior should be credited more than usual. Least credit goes to middle,
or contributing authors, who are listed between the first and senior author. Their order reflects
their relative contribution, which is significantly less than the contributions of either the first
Fig 1. Number of authors per article in sample.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215962.g001
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or senior author. In some cases, the second author is seen as the second-most important
author [21,35]. Author positioning has also been found to correlate positively with the amount
of contribution [17] and are determined by effort, not prestige or position [35].
In line with this literature, we distinguish between first authors (FIRST) and senior (last)
authors (SENIOR). We further divide contributing authors in second authors (SECOND) and
others (MIDDLE), to take in to account that the former might receive more credit. If the rele-
vant publication was single-authored, the author was coded as first author. If there were two
co-authors, the second one was labeled as the senior author, and not as second author. We also
take into account which author was marked as corresponding author on the publication
(CORR). Additionally, we record the number of authors on the focal paper (NAUTHORS) and
the article’s publication year.
Methods
We are interested in the relationship between author position and responsibility for scientific
misconduct. The analysis starts with a descriptive comparison of the proportion of responsible
and not responsible authors across roles. However, such comparison might over- or underesti-
mate the true relation between author position and responsibility because there might be other
variables which correlate with both the roles authors take on in scientific teams and the likeli-
hood that they commit misconduct. In the analysis, we will therefore employ multivariate
regression analysis to estimate the probability that a given author was found guilty of scientific
misconduct depending on the author’s position on the byline. This allows us to control for cor-
relations between author roles (i.e. first authors and senior authors cannot occur in the same
observation, so they correlate negatively), team size, and joint year effects. Joint year effects
reflect potential changing incentives to engage in misconduct over time. We include team size
in the regression model to account for the fact that the baseline probability of being responsi-
ble decreases as the number of authors increases (as there is one responsible author per publi-
cation). As our sample consists of sets of coauthors linked to corrected and retracted
publications, they likely violate the assumption that observations are i.i.d. Therefore, we calcu-
late standard errors clustered by misconduct case.
We employ a Probit regression model, specified as P(RESP = 1|X = x) =F(βX), whereF is the
cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. β is a vector of parameters
to be estimated, and X represents a set of variables. Logit models and linear probability models
estimated through OLS regression yield highly similar results. X includes our explanatory vari-
ables, that is, the author position variables FIRST, SECOND, SENIOR, and CORR, as well as
NAUTHORS. MIDDLE forms the base category of authorship position and is therefore excluded.
We also include a full set of publication year effects in order to capture joint shocks in the likeli-
hood of RESP, for instance through joint trends in typical author team size. We estimate four
main models, each of which adds variables to the analysis. The first model takes the form
PðRESP ¼ 1Þ ¼ Fðaþ b1FIRST þ b2SECONDþ b3SENIORþ �Þ ð1Þ
Here, β1−3 are key coefficients to be estimated, and represent the difference in probability of
being responsible for misconduct as compared to a middle author (the reference category). α
is a shared constant and � is the error term. In a second model, we add CORR to the model to
account for the fact that authorship credit and corresponding authorship are intertwined with
one another as well as with the responsibility for the work:
PðRESP ¼ 1Þ ¼ Fðaþ b1FIRST þ b2SECONDþ b3SENIORþ b4CORRþ �Þ ð2Þ
Scientific misconduct and accountability in teams
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In a third model, we add controls for the number of authors of the focal publication
(NAUTHORS) and a set of year indicators to capture joint trends (δt). The model then
becomes:
PðRESP ¼ 1Þ ¼ Fðaþ b1FIRST þ b2SECONDþ b3SENIORþ b4CORRþ b5NAUTHORSþ dt þ �Þ ð3Þ
It might also be the case that in some particular cases the ORI does not identify the scientist
who is actually responsible. To further test whether our results are robust to violating the key
assumption that the ORI catches the responsible author, we estimate an additional model
(model 4) where we exclude cases where the ORI reported that the responsible scientist denies
the ORI’s conclusion and or appealed the ORI’s decision. This was the case for 25% of the
cases in the sample.
We performed additional analyses including author experience (time since first publica-
tion) as well as reputation (citations stock), both scientist characteristics that can influence the
incentive to engage in misconduct, as additional control variables. While there is evidence that
scientists’ eminence and early career scientists are more likely to engage in scientific miscon-
duct as they have more to gain and less to lose [36,37], the variables turn out to have limited
explanatory power in our specific analysis and the main results do not change. They are avail-




Fig 2 shows the distribution of observations across author positions. The authors responsible
for misconduct are primarily first authors (65% of responsible vs. 8% of not responsible; test of
equal proportions: χ2(1) = 303.97; p<0.0001). Likewise, a larger share of responsible authors is
corresponding author (45% vs. 12%; χ2(1) = 107.50; p<0.0001). Senior authors account for a
similar share of responsible and not responsible authors (18% of responsible vs. 19% of not
responsible; χ2(1) = 0.003; p = 1.000). Second and middle authors are, however, less present
among responsible authors and more among innocent authors (SECOND: 7% of responsible
vs. 18% of not responsible; χ2(1) = 12.22; p = 0.0005; MIDDLE: 9% of responsible vs. 55% of
not responsible; χ2(1) = 123.31; p<0.0001). In the remainder of the analysis, we perform
regression analysis to verify the robustness of these relationships to controlling for author’s
characteristics.
Multivariate analysis
Fig 3 shows the results of the regressions by plotting the marginal effects at the mean implied
by the estimated coefficients. See S1 Table for the detailed regression results.
Model 1 only includes the author position indicators FIRST, SECOND, and SENIOR as
explanatory variables. First authors as well as senior authors are significantly more likely to be
found responsible for misconduct than middle authors with marginal effects of respectively
46.1 and 19.0 percentage points at the mean (FIRST: 95% CI: 40.4–51.7, p< 0.001; SENIOR:
95% CI = 9.9–28.2, p< 0.001). Second authors are also more likely to be responsible, but the
effect is smaller at 8.6 percentage points (95% CI: 1.1–16.1, p = 0.025). This is probably because
second authors are in many cases considered to be no different than other middle authors.
Model 2 includes CORR as additional indicator of author credit. The coefficient is positive
and significant with a marginal effect at mean of 13.8 percentage points (95% CI: 3.9–23.8,
p = 0.006). The coefficients of FIRST and SENIOR drop to respectively 41.2 percentage points
(95% CI: 34.2–48.2, p< 0.001) and 11.2 percentage points (95% CI: 3.4–18.9, p = 0.004).
Scientific misconduct and accountability in teams
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Model 3, our preferred model, adds the number of authors on the publication
(NAUTHORS) to the model to account for the fact that the ex-ante probability of being
responsible for misconduct within an author team decreases in the number of coauthors, as
well as a set of calendar year indicators. The effect size of first authors drops somewhat, to 37.8
percentage points (95% CI: 31.0–44.7, p<0.001). Corresponding authors maintain an esti-
mated positive coefficient at 13.7 percentage points higher probability (95% CI: 3.6–23.8,
p = 0.008). Senior authors are in this model not statistically more likely to be found responsible
than middle authors (mfx at mean: 8.0 percentage points, 95% CI: -0.3–16.2, p = 0.058), as are
second authors (mfx at mean: 6.5 percentage points, 95% CI: -1.4–14.4, p = 0.108). The coeffi-
cient of NAUTHORS is negative, as expected. Conditional on the other variables, every addi-
tional author decreases the baseline probability of being responsible for misconduct with 0.9
percentage points (95% CI: -1.3 - -0.4, p<0.001).
Model 4 reports the robustness check excluding cases where the responsible author denied
responsibility or appealed the case. As this model leads to highly similar conclusions as the full
sample, we exclude that our previous conclusions were driven by misallocated responsibility
for misconduct.
Discussion and conclusion
The analysis shows that scientific misconduct is not equally likely to arise from all members of
an author team. First authors, corresponding authors, and to some extent senior authors are
much more likely than middle authors to be found responsible for scientific misconduct in
Fig 2. Author position by responsibility for misconduct. The graph shows the proportion of responsible and not responsible
authors in each author position. The first four bars (FIRST, SECOND, MIDDLE, SENIOR) add to 100% as each author is assigned
one position. Note that the dark bars only add up to 99% due to rounding. One of the positions is assigned corresponding
authorship. Among responsible authors, there is a significantly larger proportion of first authors and corresponding authors, and
a smaller proportion of second and middle authors. Senior authors are represented similarly in each group. Error bars indicate
95% confidence intervals.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215962.g002
Scientific misconduct and accountability in teams
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215962 May 2, 2019 8 / 12
Findings of Research Misconduct by the U.S. Office of Research Integrity. Authorship policies
that impose accountability for the integrity of all research findings on the shoulders of all coau-
thors miss this important fact. Our findings make intuitive sense. Those who have most to
gain from the work in terms of scientific credit arguably have the highest incentives to commit
scientific misconduct. While middle authors will do equal harm to their careers if found guilty
of scientific misconduct, they reap much less of the reward since they are not lead author of
the projects.
The fact that middle authors are strongly underrepresented amongst misconducting scien-
tists aggravates the high social costs of group punishment [23,24]. The cost of false punishment
is particularly nefarious in the context of scientific misconduct, and deeply affects scientists’
career prospects [7]. We agree with the view of Helgesson and Eriksson [8]: punishing inno-
cent coauthors based on transgressions they did not do cannot be morally just unless a strong
case can be made that coauthors implicated themselves through omission. This, however,
should be proven, not assumed. Internal monitoring is also unlikely to be fully effective given
the ever increasing degree of specialization within author teams [12,21]. Moreover, incorporat-
ing the prior knowledge that misconduct is less likely to stem from middle authors, ex ante,
would even lower the potential cost of misconduct investigations through increased efficiency.
Fig 3. Coefficient plot of Probit regression of author position on responsibility. The dots indicate the predicted marginal
effect of the model variables on the probability of being responsible for scientific misconduct at the sample mean. The error
bars indicate 95% confidence intervals of the marginal effect. The underlying model is a Probit regression model. Standard
errors are clustered by misconduct case. The estimates are grouped by model. Model one includes FIRST, SECOND, SENIOR,
and a constant. The coefficients represent the added probability of being found responsible compared to middle authors, the
reference group. Model two includes a variable for corresponding authorship, CORR. Model three controls for the number of
authors on the publication (NAUTHORS) and includes a set of year indicators. Model four follows the same specification as
model three but limits the sample to those where the responsible author did not deny or appeal ORI’s findings. Across all
models, first authors remain significantly more likely to be responsible than middle authors. Senior authors are also more
likely to be responsible in model one and two, but this effect turns insignificant once CORR is added to the analysis. Note that
the 95% confidence intervals for NAUTHORS are small: [-1.3%—-0.4%] for both models where they are included.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215962.g003
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What is the best accountability policy? The goal of accountability policy should be to shift
accountability to those who are most likely to commit misconduct while not unnecessarily
implicating innocent coauthors. This is of course only true ex ante; if one author, through
investigation, is found to be responsible for the misconduct, this author should be held
accountable for it. Others should only be implicated to the extent that they violated ethical
norms themselves through omission. The finding that first and senior authors are much more
likely to commit misconduct is indicative that the shared accountability imposed by the COPE
and ALLEA guidelines lays too much accountability at the feet of contributing authors (one
should acknowledge, however, that both leave room for authors to not take responsibility for
certain parts of the work). The policies by ICMJE and CSE, compared to COPE and ALLEA,
seem to impose distinctly lower social costs in terms of potential stigmatization in cases of mis-
conduct through their approach of individual accountability. Better still, however, might be a
guarantor-type model [9,12–15]. Perhaps the best option, in terms of matching accountability
principles to empirical reality, would be a guarantor type model that holds principal authors ex
ante accountable for misconduct, given that they have the best knowledge of the essence of the
project and the highest incentives to commit or to prevent misconduct.
Supporting information
S1 Table. Probit regression of responsibility for misconduct. This table contains the full
regression results used to generate Fig 3.
(PDF)
S1 Data. Reproduction data. This file contains reproduction data in CSV format. The data is
on the publication-author level and contains the following information. CASE is an index of
ORI misconduct cases. INDEX is an index of affected publications. AUTHORNUMBER is the
author number of the relevant author. NAUTHORS contains the total number of authors listed
on the publication. CYEAR is the publication year of the article. RESP takes value 1 if the focal
author was found responsible for misconduct by the ORI, and 0 otherwise. DENIALCASE
takes value 1 if the ORI findings reported that the responsible scientist denies the ORI’s con-
clusion and or appealed the ORI’s decision. DENIALSAMPLE_EXCLUDE takes value 1 for
publication years that have too few observations to properly estimate year fixed effects once
observations with DENIALCASE equal to 1 are excluded, and 0 otherwise. These publication
years are eliminated from the sample in model 4 of Fig 3 and S1 Table. AUTH_FIRST,
AUTH_SECOND, AUTH_SENIOR, AUTH_MIDDLE take value 1 if the author is first, second,
senior, or middle author, respectively, and 0 otherwise. AUTH_CORR takes value 1 if the
author is indicated to be corresponding author, and 0 otherwise. CAREERAGE contains the
number of years since the author’s first publication at the article’s time of publication. CAR-
EERAGESQ contains the same information squared. LNCITEDBYSTOCK contains the natural
logarithm of the perpetual inventory stock of citation-weighted publications that the author
published up to the year in which the focal article was published (depreciation rate: 15%).
(CSV)
S1 Code. Reproduction code. This file contains R code that reproduces the findings presented
in Figs 1–3 and S1 Table.
(R)
Author Contributions
Conceptualization: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
Scientific misconduct and accountability in teams
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0215962 May 2, 2019 10 / 12
Data curation: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
Investigation: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
Methodology: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
Project administration: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
Writing – original draft: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
Writing – review & editing: Katrin Hussinger, Maikel Pellens.
References
1. Fanelli D, Larivière V. Researchers’ individual publication rate has not increased in a century. PLoS
One. 2016; 11: 1–12. https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0149504 PMID: 26960191
2. Wuchty S, Jones BF, Uzzi B. The increasing dominance of teams in production of knowledge. Science
(80-). 2007; 316: 1036–9. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1136099 PMID: 17431139
3. Stephan PE. How economics shapes science. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Business Press; 2012.
4. Greene M. The demise of the lone author. Nature. 2007; 450: 1165. https://doi.org/10.1038/4501165a
PMID: 18097387
5. Gans JS, Murray F. Markets for Scientific Attribution. NBER Work Pap. 2014;20677. https://doi.org/10.
3386/w20677
6. Bikard M, Murray F, Gans JS. Exploring Trade-offs in the Organization of Scientific Work: Collaboration
and Scientific Reward. Manage Sci. 2015; 61: 1473–1495. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2014.2052
7. Hussinger K, Pellens M. Guilt by association: How scientific misconduct harms prior collaborators. Res
Policy. 2018;Forthcomin. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2018.01.012
8. Helgesson G, Eriksson S. Responsibility for scientific misconduct in collaborative papers. Medicine,
Health Care and Philosophy. Springer Netherlands; 2017. pp. 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11019-017-
9817-7 PMID: 29222668
9. Rennie D, Yank V, Emanuel L. When authorship fails: a proposal to make contributors accountable.
JAMA. 1997; 28: 579–585.
10. Jones AH. Can authorship policies help prevent scientific misconduct? What role for scientific societies?
Sci Eng Ethics. 2003; 9: 243–256. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-003-0011-3 PMID: 12774656
11. Wager E, Kleinert S. Responsible research publication: international standards for authors. A position
statement developed at the 2nd world conference on research integrity, Singapore, July 22–24, 2010.
In: Mayer T, Steneck N, editors. Promoting research integrity in a global environment. Imperial College
Press/World Science Publishing; 2011. pp. 309–316. https://doi.org/10.1142/9789814340984_0006
12. Rennie D. Who did what? Authorship and contribution in 2001. Muscle and Nerve. 2001; 24: 1274–
1277. https://doi.org/10.1002/mus.1144 PMID: 11562905
13. Eggert LD. Best practices for allocating appropriate credit and responsibility to authors of multi-authored
articles. Front Psychol. 2011; 2: 1–6. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2011.00001
14. Smith E, Williams-Jones B. Authorship and Responsibility in Health Sciences Research: A Review of
Procedures for Fairly Allocating Authorship in Multi-Author Studies. Sci Eng Ethics. 2012; 18: 199–212.
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11948-011-9263-5 PMID: 21312000
15. McKneally M. Put my name on that paper: Reflections on the ethics of authorship. J Thorac Cardiovasc
Surg. 2006; 131: 517–519. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jtcvs.2005.09.060 PMID: 16515898
16. American Psychological Association. Publication Practices & Responsible Authorship [Internet]. 2018
[cited 8 Aug 2018]. Available: http://www.apa.org/research/responsible/publication/index.aspx
17. Sauermann H, Haeussler C. Authorship and contribution disclosures. Sci Adv. 2017; 3. https://doi.org/
10.1126/sciadv.1700404 PMID: 29152564
18. Wager E. Do medical journals provide clear and consistent guidelines on authorship? MedGenMed.
2007; 9: 16.
19. Bosch X, Hernández C, Pericas JM, Doti P, Marušić A. Misconduct Policies in High-Impact Biomedical
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